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Patenting DNA: Balancing the Need to Incentivize 
Innovation in Biotechnology with the Need to 
Make High-Quality Genetic Testing Accessible to 
Patients* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of gene patentability implicates everyone from doctors, to 
patients, to biotechnology researchers, to holders of patents claiming 
genes of all kinds.  Proponents of gene patents argue that patents are 
necessary for incentivizing innovation, commercializing valuable 
inventions, and promoting the disclosure of information for the benefit of 
the public, and that these objectives are particularly important in the 
biotechnology industry.  Opponents of gene patents fear that the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent restrict public access to medical 
treatments and diagnostic methods, which raises serious questions about 
the appropriate scope of such patents.  These opposing positions spur the 
gene patent debate.  To resolve this debate, the need to incentivize 
innovation must be balanced with the need to make medical testing and 
treatment readily available and affordable to the public. 
This Comment argues that isolated genes are proper subjects for 
patent claims and should not be categorically excluded from patent-
eligible subject matter.  Additionally, however, this Comment recognizes 
that gene patents raise legitimate concern about patient access to high-
quality genetic tests; therefore, Congress should enact certain research 
exemptions that would immunize researchers from infringement liability 
for performing noncommercial activities involving a patented gene.  Part 
II.A discusses the purpose of the United States Patent Act and 
summarizes the subjects considered eligible for patent protection under 
current law.  Part II.B briefly describes the science underlying gene 
patents and discusses gene patents in the context of an ongoing case, 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & 
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Trademark Office.1  Part II.C then explains opposing concerns 
surrounding gene patents, including the need to incentivize research, the 
need to make genetic testing available and affordable to patients, and the 
role that gene patents will likely play in whole genome sequencing.  Part 
III.A emphasizes the importance of continuing to hold genes to be 
patent-eligible subject matter, while using the current requirements of 
patentability to invalidate claims undeserving of patent protection.  Part 
III.B suggests solutions to the gene patent debate and examines the 
merits of each proposed solution.  Finally, Part IV concludes that 
Congress should enact a statutory research exemption and cautiously 
consider alternative solutions like compulsory licensing or exercising 
march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. United States Patent Law 
1. Purpose of Patents 
The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant patents to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”2  A patent confers on an 
inventor “the right to exclude others from making, using, . . . or selling 
[his] invention” for twenty years.3  Several justifications exist for 
granting these exclusive rights, although there is some disagreement over 
the validity of these theories.4  First, patent rights incentivize useful 
inventions by promising inventors and investors the opportunity to profit 
from their expended time, effort, and money.5  Second, patent rights 
incentivize the commercialization of inventions.6  Patents promote not 
only investments in research and development, but also the investments 
needed to make inventions commercially available for the benefit of the 
public.7  And third, patent rights incentivize disclosure of inventions.8  
                                                 
 1.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), aff’g in part, rev’g in part, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 
Sept. 25, 2012. 
 2.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 3.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
 4.  See infra Part II.C. 
 5.  Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
see also 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01, at 3-6 (2009). 
 6.  See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Indus., 610 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 7.  Id. 
VOGEL FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2012  5:12 PM 
2012] PATENTING DNA 259 
Information disclosed in the patent becomes publicly available so that it 
may “stimulate further innovation and . . . permit the public to practice 
the invention once the patent expires.”9  While patent rights are often 
couched in terms of rewarding an individual inventor’s labor,10 their true 
purpose is to promote progress for the benefit of society.11  Indeed, the 
Constitution empowers Congress to grant patents because 
“encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of . . . inventors in ‘Science 
and useful Arts.’”12 
The biotechnology industry, where development of lifesaving 
therapies costs hundreds of millions of dollars,13 illustrates this need to 
incentivize individuals to invest their time and money in discoveries that 
ultimately benefit society.  Patent rights enable an inventor to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the patented invention,14 thereby 
allowing the inventor to recoup on the investment and realize a profit.15  
The potential for profit drives researchers and investors to continue 
devoting resources to valuable innovations.16  While this is true in all 
industries, patent rights are particularly important to biotechnology 
companies, which rank patents as the most important means of securing a 
competitive advantage for their businesses.17 
                                                 
 8.  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“Sacrificial days devoted to such 
creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”). 
 11.  See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“[T]he patent statutes 
make[] reward to the [inventor] a secondary consideration.”). 
 12.  Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 13.  See Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is 
Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 477 (2007) (studying compound-
specific data to estimate the cost of biopharmaceutical research and development). 
 14.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 15.  See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (discussing “pecuniary rewards stemming from the patent right”). 
 16.  Id. at 1372–73 (quoting King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)). 
 17.  See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: 
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1290 fig.1, 1290–91 
(2009) (showing that the importance of patents varies by industry and summarizing survey results in 
which startup biotechnology firms ranked patents as their most important appropriability strategy). 
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2. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter and Patentability 
To be valid, a patent claim must first be directed to patent-eligible 
subject matter,18 and then must satisfy the additional requirements of 
utility,19 novelty,20 nonobviousness,21 and adequate disclosure.22  Thus, 
patent eligibility presents a threshold inquiry that must be resolved 
before a court turns to the other elements of patentability.23  Patent 
eligibility requires the subject matter of an invention to be the type of 
discovery that Congress intended to protect.24  The scope of patent-
eligible subject matter is outlined in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides that 
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter are 
proper subjects for patents.25 
a. “Anything Under the Sun That is Made by Man” 
The categories of patent-eligible subject matter have been broadly 
construed in accordance with “the constitutional and statutory goal of 
promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’”26  The Patent 
Act provides that a patent may be granted for “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”27  Congress 
need not authorize patent protection for specific subject matters; instead, 
courts determine whether the subject falls within one of the statutorily 
defined categories.28  Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that Congress 
intended patent-eligible subject matter to “include anything under the sun 
                                                 
 18.  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. § 102. 
 21.  Id. § 103(a). 
 22.  Id. § 112. 
 23.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).  “The question here, as it always has been, 
is: are the inventions claimed of a kind contemplated by Congress as possibly patentable if they turn 
out to be new, useful, and unobvious . . . .”  In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 963–64 (C.C.P.A. 1979), 
vacated in part sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), and aff’d sub nom. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 24.  See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
 25.  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 26.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 27.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added); see also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (“In choosing 
such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive 
‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.” (quoting 35 
U.S.C. § 101)). 
 28.  See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130–31 (2001) 
(quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315). 
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that is made by man.”29  Even living organisms—from a genetically 
engineered bacterium30 to plant breeds developed by humans31—are 
proper subjects for patents, provided they are the product of human 
intervention.32  The scope of the U.S. patent laws is necessarily broad, as 
to include scientific advances that were unforeseeable when Congress 
enacted § 101.33 
b. Limitations on Patent-Eligible Subject Matter: Laws of Nature, 
Physical Phenomena, and Abstract Ideas 
Although courts have broadly construed the language of § 101, the 
scope of patent-eligible subject matter is limited by three judicially 
created exceptions34: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.”35  Although inventions or discoveries that fall within these 
excepted categories might properly be classified as patent-eligible 
processes or compositions of matter, they are not the type of invention 
that patents are intended to protect;36 rather, “they are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.”37  A patent on these “tools” might 
improperly restrict further discovery.38  As such, a botanist could not 
patent a new plant discovered in the wild, nor could a physicist patent the 
law of gravity.39  Similarly, a scientist who discovers certain natural 
qualities of bacteria cannot obtain a patent on those qualities.40  These 
                                                 
 29.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-
1923, at 6 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30.  Id. at 310. 
 31.  J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 145. 
 32.  See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313 (finding that patent-eligible subject matter is that which 
is the result of human “ingenuity and research”). 
 33.  J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 135. 
 34.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (explaining that these exceptions are not 
statutory, but nonetheless, are clearly established under the doctrine of stare decisis and are 
consistent with the statutory requirements of novelty and utility). 
 35.  Id. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309) (internal quotation marks omitted).  These 
exceptions have also been characterized as “phenomena of nature, mental processes, and products of 
nature.”  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1349 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 36.  See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 & n.15 (1978). 
 37.  Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67. 
 38.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012). 
 39.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
 40.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
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naturally occurring qualities are the work of nature.41  Such discoveries 
are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men 
and reserved exclusively to none.”42 
These specific exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter have been 
well established for over 150 years,43 and the Supreme Court has thus far 
declined to carve out any additional exceptions.44  Rather, the 
requirements of utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure 
should ensure that patent protection is not improperly afforded to a 
discovery or invention.45  Furthermore, the Court has cautioned lower 
courts against imposing bright-line limitations on patent-eligible subject 
matter,46 stating that a public-policy-based limitation on patent eligibility 
should come from Congress.47  Such a decision requires a “balancing of 
competing values and interests,” which must be conducted by elected 
representatives, not courts.48  So for now, laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas are the only subject matters expressly 
excluded from patent eligibility. 
While a patent cannot claim one of these excepted categories, a 
patent may claim an application of a law of nature, physical 
phenomenon, or abstract idea to a structure or process.49  In other words, 
“a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of 
                                                 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Funk Bros. 
Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10, 316–17 (concluding that genetically engineered 
bacterium is patent-eligible subject matter because it does not fall within the natural phenomenon 
exception and refusing to establish a bright-line, policy-based rule against patenting living 
organisms).  In Bilski, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, advocated creating a bright-line rule 
excluding business methods from patent-eligible subject matter, but the majority declined to do so.  
130 S. Ct. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 45.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (explaining that “[c]oncerns about attempts to call any form 
of human activity a ‘process’ can be met by making sure the claim meets the requirements of § 101” 
instead of establishing an additional exception to patent eligibility). 
 46.  See id. (cautioning that the existence of the three judicially created exceptions does not give 
“the Judiciary carte blanche to impose other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the 
statute’s purpose and design”). 
 47.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187–88 (1981) (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 
(1923); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854); Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853)). 
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nature[, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea].”50  But “to transform an 
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a 
law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding 
the words ‘apply it.’”51  The process must contain other elements 
exhibiting an “inventive concept,” such that the claimed invention is 
much more than the law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea 
itself.52  For example, the Arrhenius equation, which provides the cure 
time for rubber as a function of temperature,53 is a formula reflecting a 
law of nature and is therefore not patent-eligible subject matter.54  But a 
process for molding rubber that utilizes the Arrhenius equation is 
properly considered patent eligible.55  The process must still meet the 
other requirements for patentability, but at the very least, it satisfies the 
threshold inquiry.56  Essentially, an inventor may not claim the formula 
in the abstract;57 rather, he must claim use of the formula in conjunction 
with an inventive structure or process.58 
B. United States Patent Law in the Context of Gene Patents 
Until recently, § 101 has been a fairly dormant area of patent law.59  
But a number of recent cases—including several involving gene 
patents—have changed that.  Below is a brief explanation of the science 
underlying gene patents, followed by a discussion of recent litigation 
over gene patents, focusing on Association for Molecular Pathology v. 
                                                 
 50.  Id. at 187 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 51.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) (citing 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)). 
 52.  Id. (citing Parker, 437 U.S. at 594). 
 53.  Diamond, 450 U.S. at 178 n.2. 
 54.  Id. at 188. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 191 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).  A patent claim may not be 
directed to a formula in the abstract; this rule may not be avoided by directing the claim to use of the 
formula in a certain technological environment or by failing to claim significant post-solution 
activity.  Id. at 191–92 (citing Parker, 437 U.S. 584). 
 58.  Id. at 192. 
 59.  See, e.g., Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 519, 519 (2006) (noting that patent eligibility has been a relatively dormant 
doctrine, resurfacing with the advent of new technologies and scientific imperatives). 
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United States Patent & Trademark Office.60  This discussion will help 
frame the controversy surrounding gene patents. 
1. Underlying Science 
The human genome contains approximately 22,000 genes.61  
Hereditary traits—such as eye color, hair color, height, weight, and even 
an increased risk of developing certain diseases—are dictated by 
genetics.62  Each gene is made up of DNA, and each DNA molecule is 
made up of a sequence of nucleotide bases.63  A gene’s nucleotide 
sequence encodes for the amino acids that comprise a particular 
protein;64 for example, “the BRCA1 gene encodes for the BRCA1 
protein.”65  A mutation in a gene’s sequence changes the structure and 
function of the protein encoded by that gene.66  In some cases, the effect 
of a mutation is serious, causing or increasing the risk of a particular 
disease.67  For example, mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are 
associated with a greater risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer.68  
Women with BRCA mutations are four to six times more likely to 
develop breast cancer during their lifetimes than women without such 
mutations.69  Thus, genetic testing for these mutations is an important 
diagnostic tool.  It allows patients to take precautionary measures, such 
as regular cancer screening or even prophylactic mastectomy, and also 
provides physicians with information relevant to cancer treatment plans, 
as cancers related to BRCA mutations are best treated by certain types of 
chemotherapy.70 
                                                 
 60.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), aff’g in part, rev’g in part, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 
Sept. 25, 2012. 
 61.  Id. at 1310. 
 62.  JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 17 (5th ed. 2004). 
 63.  Id. at 20–23, 28. 
 64.  Id. at 35–36. 
 65.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 66.  WATSON, supra note 62, at 470. 
 67.  See id.  For example, sickle cell anemia is caused by a genetic mutation.  Id. 
 68.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1339. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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A few key points will simplify the underlying science and facilitate a 
discussion of various issues raised by gene patents.  First, the specific 
DNA sequence comprising a particular gene exists naturally in the 
human body as an integrated piece of a larger biological structure.71  An 
isolated gene is a sequence of DNA cleaved from surrounding genetic 
material and removed from its natural cellular environment.72  In this 
Comment, the term “gene patent” refers to a patent claiming an isolated 
gene (also referred to as an isolated sequence of DNA) or to a patent 
claiming a diagnostic method involving an isolated gene. 
2. Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & 
Trademark Office 
The patentability of the BRCA genes is the issue in the ongoing case 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & 
Trademark Office.73  There, a group of plaintiffs, comprised of various 
medical organizations, genetic researchers and counselors, and breast 
cancer and ovarian cancer patients,74 is suing Myriad Genetics asking the 
court to invalidate Myriad’s patent claims to the BRCA genes on grounds 
that human genes are patent-ineligible subject matter.75  The challenged 
patent claims pertain to the isolated BRCA genes and diagnostic methods 
involving those genes.76  The district court agreed with the plaintiffs, 
holding that Myriad’s claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject 
matter.77  However, the Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that the 
composition claim to isolated DNA and one of the diagnostic method 
claims were directed to patent-eligible subject matter.78  The Supreme 
Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for 
further consideration in light of a recent Court decision, Mayo 
                                                 
 71.  See WATSON, supra note 62, at 647 (describing the complexity of the living cell). 
 72.  See id. at 647–72 (describing techniques for isolating and sequencing DNA). 
 73.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), aff’g in part, rev’g in part, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 
Sept. 25, 2012. 
 74.  Id. at 1308. 
 75.  Id. at 1309. 
 76.  Id. at 1309–10. 
 77.  See id. at 1308. 
 78.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1794 (2012). 
VOGEL FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2012  5:12 PM 
266 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.79  On remand, the 
Federal Circuit reaffirmed its earlier ruling upholding the composition 
claims and one method claim.80  The plaintiffs have filed a second 
petition for certiorari, again challenging the patent eligibility of isolated 
genes81 and also arguing the Federal Circuit misapplied Mayo to the facts 
of Association for Molecular Pathology.82 
a. Patent Eligibility of Myriad’s Claims to Genes as Compositions of 
Matter 
The challenged patent claims outlined above include two types of 
claims: (1) a composition-of-matter claim to isolated DNA and (2) 
claims to diagnostic methods.  Both types of claims generate controversy 
in the context of gene patents; accordingly, each type is analyzed 
separately below. 
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has long held 
isolated DNA molecules to be patent-eligible subject matter,83 but the 
topic nonetheless has been the subject of much debate.  Michael Crichton 
famously wrote, “You, or someone you love, may die because of a gene 
patent that should never have been granted in the first place.”84  Crichton 
went on to describe genes existing in an individual’s body as the “private 
property” of the patent holder.85  This statement mischaracterizes the 
science and the law at issue in gene patents, because, as explained in Part 
II.B.1, gene patents claim isolated genes, not genes as they exist in the 
                                                 
 79.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794, 1794 (2012) 
(mem.). 
 80.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 25, 2012. 
 81.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (No. 2010-1406), 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4098, at 35. 
 82.  Id. at 31, 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4098, at 49. 
 83.  See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001), 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf (“[A]n inventor’s discovery of a gene 
can be the basis for a patent on the genetic composition isolated from its natural state and processed 
through purifying steps that separate the gene from other molecules naturally associated with it.”); 
see also Andrew W. Torrance, Gene Concepts, Gene Talk, and Gene Patents, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 157, 176–77 (2010) (describing a patent issued in 1982 that was the first to “claim[] genes per 
se”). 
 84.  Michael Crichton, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/opinion/13crichton.html. 
 85.  Id. 
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human body.  Crichton’s statement does, however, reflect some of the 
concerns triggered by patents relating to the human body.86 
Nonetheless, in keeping with the USPTO’s longstanding position on 
patent claims involving genes, the Federal Circuit in its original decision 
in Association for Molecular Pathology held that “claims to isolated 
DNAs . . . are directed to patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.”87  
In so doing, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s attempt to fit 
isolated DNA molecules within the “products of nature” exception to 
patent eligibility.88  On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit stated that Mayo does not control the question of patent eligibility 
with respect to the composition-of-matter claims,89 and therefore 
reaffirmed its earlier ruling upholding those claims.  Using the 
framework provided by Diamond v. Chakrabarty90 and Funk Bros. Seed 
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,91 the Federal Circuit asserted that “[o]ne 
distinction . . . between products of nature and human-made invention for 
purposes of § 101 turns on a change in the claimed composition’s 
identity compared with what exists in nature.”92 
In Chakrabarty, the Court held that a manmade living organism was 
patent-eligible subject matter.93  The bacteria at issue were genetically 
engineered to break down multiple components of crude oil, which no 
single naturally occurring bacterium could do.94  This capability had 
important applications in cleaning oil spills.95  Because the “claim [was] 
not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally 
                                                 
 86. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (discussing concerns that gene patents open the door to patenting a 
person’s organs), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 87.  Id. at 1350. 
 88.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 
220–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub 
nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 89.  As discussed in Part II.B.2.b.ii., infra, Mayo invalided method claims that preempted a law 
of nature.  On remand, the Federal Circuit in Association for Molecular Pathology held that Mayo 
was inapplicable to the patent eligibility of isolated DNA, because “[a] composition of matter is not 
a law of nature.”  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 25, 2012. 
 90.  447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 91.  333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 92.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1327–28. 
 93.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310. 
 94.  Id. at 305. 
 95.  Id. at n.2. 
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occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human 
ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use,’” the Court 
held the bacteria to be patent eligible.96  The Court distinguished the 
bacteria in Chakrabarty from the newly discovered but naturally 
occurring bacterial trait that was held to be patent-ineligible subject 
matter in Funk Bros., finding that the bacteria in Chakrabarty had 
“markedly different characteristics from any [bacterium] found in 
nature,” derived from the efforts of the patentee.97 
Relying on Chakrabarty, the Federal Circuit in Association for 
Molecular Pathology concluded that claims to isolated DNA molecules 
are “drawn to patent-eligible subject matter because the claims cover 
molecules that are markedly different—have a distinctive chemical 
structure and identity—from those found in nature.”98  The court relied 
on the fact that isolated DNA molecules are cleaved from a larger 
structural complex or, in some cases, are chemically synthesized, giving 
them a chemical structure different from that of native DNA.99  A DNA 
molecule, “when it is bonded to other genetic material, is worlds apart 
from . . . an isolated DNA molecule that is in hand and usable.”100  
Patents encourage and protect inventive activities that “reduc[e] a portion 
of nature to concrete form.”101 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that isolated DNA is not 
“markedly different” from native DNA because they both share the same 
nucleotide sequence.102  The court reasoned that “the patent eligibility of 
an isolated DNA is not negated because it has similar informational 
properties to a different, more complex natural material.”  Instead the 
court relied on the distinct structure and identity of isolated DNA to 
uphold its patent eligibility.103  The court concluded that isolated DNA is 
a manmade invention, rather than a product of nature, and is therefore 
patent-eligible subject matter.104 
                                                 
 96.  Id. at 309–10 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 
615 (1887)). 
 97.  Id. at 310. 
 98.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 25, 2012. 
 99.  Id. at 1328. 
 100.  Id. at 1331. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 1330 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
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b. Patent Eligibility of Myriad’s Claims to Diagnostic Methods 
Diagnostic method claims, like those at issue in Association for 
Molecular Pathology, have been a source of controversy in other recent 
cases.105  Diagnostic method claims are directed to a “correlation 
between a patient’s medical data and a medical prognosis.”106  For 
example, a claim directed to a method for measuring the level of a 
particular amino acid in a patient and using that measurement to 
diagnose a vitamin deficiency is a diagnostic method claim.107  Genetic 
diagnostic claims involve correlations between a specific DNA sequence 
and a particular disease.108  These types of claims raise concerns because 
a correlation is a law of nature109—the fact that a certain measurement 
indicates a vitamin deficiency, or that a certain genetic mutation 
indicates an increased risk of disease is a naturally occurring correlation 
that cannot be patented.  But, a method that applies that law of nature to 
a diagnostic purpose can be patented.110  Thus, concerns arise that a 
diagnostic method patent comes too close to patenting the law of nature 
itself, thereby allowing the patent holder to circumvent the established 
rules of patent eligibility. 
                                                 
 105.  See, e.g., Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1060–61 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, Feb. 28, 2012; Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 
628 F.3d 1347, 1649–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 106.  Asher Hodes, Note, Diagnosing Patentable Subject Matter, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 225, 
225 (2011). 
 107.  See Metabolite Labs. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 
2004), cert. granted, 546 U.S. 975 (2005), and cert. dismissed, 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (per curiam).  In 
Metabolite Laboratories, the patent at issue centered on a correlation between elevated levels of a 
particular amino acid and a B vitamin deficiency.  Id. at 1358.  The patent eligibility of the 
diagnostic method claim was not challenged in the Federal Circuit, so the court did not address this 
issue.  See id. at 1365–69 (describing Lab Corp.’s asserted grounds for patent invalidity).  The 
Supreme Court initially granted certiorari, but then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.  
Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (per curiam).  Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Souter, dissented from the dismissal, arguing the Court 
should have ruled on the issue of patent eligibility and expressing the view that the claim is directed 
to a patent-ineligible phenomenon of nature.  Id. at 138 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 108.  Hodes, supra note 106, at 243–44, 247–48. 
 109.  See Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. at 135, 137–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 110.  See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (stating that “an application of a law of 
nature . . . to a known . . . process may well be deserving of patent protection” (citing Funk Bros. 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 
261 U.S. 45 (1923); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1877); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1854); 
Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1853))). 
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However, diagnostic method claims must pass the threshold test 
pertaining to patent-eligible subject matter,111 which should theoretically 
avoid the realization of such concerns.  Courts consider a variety of 
factors in determining the patent eligibility of a claimed method.  The 
machine-or-transformation test is one such consideration.112  Under this 
test, courts determine whether the claim “(1) . . . is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus, or (2) . . . transforms a particular article into a 
different state or thing.”113  The presence of these factors can support a 
finding of patent eligibility.114  Although the Court recently held that the 
machine-or-transformation test is not a bright-line rule and is not 
conclusive on the issue of patent eligibility, it also noted that the test is a 
“useful and important clue.”115  Thus, the test remains relevant to 
discussions regarding the patent eligibility of diagnostic method claims. 
 
i. The Federal Circuit’s Original Decision 
 
In its original decision in Association for Molecular Pathology, the 
Federal Circuit addressed the patent eligibility of Myriad’s “method 
claims directed to ‘comparing’ or ‘analyzing’ DNA sequences,” finding 
those claims to fit into the “abstract, mental steps” exception to patent-
eligible subject matter.116  Myriad’s “comparing” and “analyzing” claim 
language describes a “‘method for screening a tumor sample,’ by 
‘comparing’ a first BRCA1 sequence from a tumor sample and a second 
BRCA1 sequence from a non-tumor sample, wherein a difference in 
sequence indicates an alteration in the tumor sample.”117  The court held 
this claim describes only the abstract mental steps involved in comparing 
two strings of nucleotide bases, and it was therefore not directed to a 
patent-eligible process.118 
                                                 
 111.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
 112.  Id. at 3225–28. 
 113.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. 
Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 114.  Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 117.  Id. at 1355–56 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,710,001 (filed June 7, 1995)). 
 118.  Id. at 1357. 
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Also in its original decision, the Federal Circuit held one of Myriad’s 
method claims to be patent eligible.  Myriad’s claim to a “method for 
screening potential cancer therapeutics” included “steps of ‘growing’ 
transformed cells in the presence or absence of a potential cancer 
therapeutic, an inherently transformative step involving the manipulation 
of the cells and their growth medium,” as well as “‘determining’ the 
cells’ growth rates, a step that also necessarily involves physical 
manipulation of the cells.”119  The court found both of these steps to be 
central to the claimed diagnostic method and therefore held the claim to 
be directed to patent-eligible subject matter.120 
ii. Further Consideration in Light of Mayo Collaborative Services 
Following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Association for 
Molecular Pathology, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the 
judgment, and remanded the case to the Federal Circuit for 
reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories.121  The claims at issue in Mayo 
involved a method for optimizing the efficacy of a patient’s autoimmune 
disease treatment.122  The method used natural laws to describe the 
relationship between a drug’s metabolite levels in a patient and the 
efficacy or toxicity of drug treatment.123  Specifically, one patent claim 
set forth the following relationships: if the metabolite levels exceed a 
certain threshold, then the administered dose is likely to induce harmful 
side effects, so the dose should be decreased; conversely, if the 
metabolite levels are lower than a certain threshold, then the 
administered dose is likely ineffective, so the dose should be 
increased.124  The Federal Circuit in Mayo found that the claimed steps of 
administering a drug to a patient, determining the drug’s metabolite 
levels in the patient, and using those metabolite measurements to 
determine subsequent drug dosages constituted the “application of 
naturally occurring correlations,” and therefore held the method to be 
                                                 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794, 1794 (2012) 
(mem.), remanded to sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 122.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See id. 
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directed to patent-eligible subject matter.125  The court also found that the 
method satisfied the machine-or-transformation test, as administering a 
drug transforms a patient’s body chemistry, and determining metabolite 
levels requires transforming blood and tissue samples to extract 
metabolites and determine their levels.126  Finding these steps to be 
central to the claim127—as opposed to mere data-gathering steps, which 
are not patentable as processes under § 101128—the Federal Circuit held 
the diagnostic method claim in Mayo was directed to patent-eligible 
subject matter.129 
The Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the claims in 
Mayo attempted to patent a law of nature.130  The Court summarized the 
claims as instructing doctors to “(1) measure (somehow) the current level 
of the relevant metabolite, (2) use particular (unpatentable) laws of 
nature . . . to calculate the current toxicity/inefficacy limits, and (3) 
reconsider the drug dosage in light of the law.”131  In other words, the 
Court found that the claim simply stated the law, and then told doctors to 
somehow apply it.132 
Upon further consideration in light of Mayo, the Federal Circuit in 
Association for Molecular Pathology reaffirmed its earlier ruling with 
respect to Myriad’s method claims.133  The court again invalidated the 
“comparing” and “analyzing” claims, reiterating its prior logic for 
finding the claims to cover an abstract mental process, and further 
finding the claims “indistinguishable” from the claims invalidated by the 
                                                 
 125.  Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1350–51, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 126.  Id. at 1355–57. 
 127.  Id. at 1357. 
 128.  Id.  The Federal Circuit distinguished the claims at issue in Prometheus Laboratories from 
prior cases involving claims that attempted to patent data-gathering steps.  Id.  One applicant 
claimed a process for “(1) performing a clinical test on individuals and (2) based on the data from 
that test, determining if an abnormality existed and determining the possible causes of any 
abnormality by using an algorithm.”  Id. at 1358 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839–41 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989)).  The clinical tests were not transformative; they were performed only to gather data.  Id. 
(citing Grams, 888 F.2d at 840).  A mathematical algorithm in combination with gathering data is 
not patent eligible and thus the claimed methods were not patent eligible.  Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943, 963 (2008)). 
 129.  Id. at 1359. 
 130.  Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012). 
 131.  Id. at 1299. 
 132.  Id. at 1299–1300. 
 133.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333–
34 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 25, 2012. 
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Supreme Court Mayo.134  Neither the claims at issue in Mayo, nor the 
“comparing” and “analyzing” claims in Association for Molecular 
Pathology, were “sufficiently transformative” of what otherwise 
constituted a natural law or abstract idea.135 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit upheld Myriad’s claim to a method 
for screening potential cancer therapeutics.136  In doing so, the court both 
affirmed its prior logic and distinguished the screening method from the 
claims at issue in Mayo.137  Myriad’s method claim comprises “(1) 
growing host cells transformed with an altered BRCA1 gene in the 
presence or absence of a potential cancer therapeutic, (2) determining the 
growth rate of the host cells with or without the potential therapeutic, and 
(3) comparing the growth rate of the host cells.”138  The plaintiffs argued 
that the “determining” and “comparing” steps preempted a law of nature, 
like the claims that were invalidated in Mayo.139  The court, however, 
focused on the “transformed” nature of the cells—in other words, the 
cells are not naturally occurring, but are instead “derived by altering a 
cell to include a foreign gene, resulting in a man-made, transformed cell 
with enhanced function and utility.”140  Thus, the screening method is 
more than an abstract mental step or law of nature, and the claim does 
more than “simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply 
it.’”141  Rather, the claim recites steps that are applied to manmade, 
transformed cells.142  Because the underlying subject matter—a 
manmade, transformed cell—is patent eligible, a method applying 
various procedures to that subject is also patent eligible.143  This 
distinguishes Myriad’s claim from the claims in Mayo, where the recited 
steps were insufficient to differentiate the method from the underlying 
law of nature.144  Therefore, the court reaffirmed its prior ruling and 
                                                 
 134.  Id. at 1335. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 1333–34. 
 137.  Id. at 1335–37. 
 138.  Id. at 1336. 
 139.  Id. at 1335–36. 
 140.  Id. at 1336 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 col.27 11.28–33 (filed June 7, 1995)). 
 141.  Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 
(2012)). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
VOGEL FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/7/2012  5:12 PM 
274 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
upheld the patent eligibility of the claim to a method for screening 
therapeutics.145 
Now, the Supreme Court has second opportunity to weigh-in on the 
issue of patent-eligible subject matter, as the plaintiffs have filed a 
second petition for certiorari.   
C. Opposing Policy Concerns Give Rise to the Gene Patent Debate 
Proponents of gene patents argue that patents are needed to 
incentivize invention, commercialization of valuable inventions, and 
disclosure of information for the benefit of the public, and that these 
incentives are particularly important in the biotechnology industry.  
Opponents of gene patents fear that patented services and testing will be 
unaffordable or otherwise inaccessible to consumers.  These opposing 
positions give rise to the gene patent debate; each position is discussed in 
greater detail below.  The effect of gene patents on whole genome 
sequencing and personalized medicine is an especially important topic in 
the debate, so it receives its own section. 
1. Incentivizing Genetic Research 
Patents incentivize individuals to invest their time and money in 
discovering and commercializing inventions that ultimately benefit 
society.146  This is especially true in the biotechnology industry.  In fact, 
patents for genes have been characterized as the “fuel” for the “R&D 
engine” that produces and commercializes biotechnologies.147  For 
example, Myriad has spent over $500 million developing and 
commercializing its BRCA tests.148  Richard Marsh, executive vice 
president, general counsel, and secretary of Myriad, has said that it took 
Myriad over ten years to recoup on its investment in BRCA tests and that 
                                                 
 145.  Id. at 1337. 
 146.  See supra notes 5–17 and accompanying text. 
 147.  Brief of Amici Curiae Christopher M. Holman & Robert Cook-Deegan in Support of 
Neither Party at 7–8, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853323, at *7–*8 (quoting OFFICE OF TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-218, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 
(1984); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-494, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(1991); FTC, EMERGING HEALTHCARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION (2009)). 
 148.  See The Defendants: An Interview with Richard Marsh of Myriad Genetics, GENEWATCH, 
Oct.–Dec. 2010, at 13 [hereinafter The Defendants], available at http://issuu.com 
/genewatchmagazine/docs/genewatch23-5. 
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the promise of patent protection was the only reason Myriad was able to 
make the initial research and development investment.149  Due to the 
significant time and money required to develop and commercialize 
biotechnologies, researchers and investors need assurance that 
intellectual property protection will enable them to realize some return 
on their investment.150 
But, there is more to the story of the biotechnology industry’s need 
for intellectual property rights.  Myriad is a large corporation, with over 
1,100 employees and fiscal year 2011 revenue of over $400 million.151  
Most biotechnology companies, however, are small start-up businesses, 
with less than 50 employees working on products that may take over a 
decade to produce.152  Because these businesses generate no immediate 
revenue from product sales, they must raise hundreds of millions of 
dollars to research, develop, and commercialize their inventions.153  
“Patents ‘are typically the only assets those firms possess that are 
sufficiently stable and valuable to attract the large amounts of capital 
they need to exploit promising research toward new drugs and 
diagnostics.’”154  Thus, patent rights are critical to the survival and 
success of these small biotechnology companies. 
Nonetheless, some scholars oppose the assertion that patents are 
necessary to stimulate scientific innovation.  The Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society (SACGHS) investigated 
“the effects of patents and licensing practices on basic genetic research, 
genetic test development, patient access to genetic tests, and genetic 
testing quality,” concluding that “patents on genetic discoveries do not 
                                                 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See, e.g., id. (quoting Richard Marsh as saying that Myriad would not invest time or money 
in a product unless they know there is some promise of intellectual property protection). 
 151.  Investor Relations, MYRIAD, http://investor.myriad.com (last visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 152.  Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization & the Ass’n of University Technology 
Managers as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal at 25, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d 
1329 (No. 2010-1406), 2010 WL 4853322, at *25 (citing BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., GUIDE TO 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 2008, at 2, 77 (2008)); see also ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS: GLOBAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2011, at 2, 40 (2011), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ 
Beyond_borders_global_biotechnology_report_2011/$FILE/Beyond_borders_global_biotechnology
_report_2011.pdf (reporting biotechnology industry statistics for 2010 and showing that of the 315 
publicly traded biotechnology companies, thirteen “commercial leaders” in the industry employ 
74,230 individuals, while 38,000 employees are spread among the remaining 302 companies). 
 153.  Brief for Biotechnology Industry Organization & the Ass’n of University Technology 
Managers as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal, supra note 152, at 25–26. 
 154.  Id. at 26 (quoting CLAUDE BARFIELD & JOHN E. CALFEE, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE 
PATENT SYSTEM 27 (2007)). 
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appear to be necessary for either basic genetic research or the 
development of available genetic tests.”155 
SACGHS found that scientists are usually motivated to conduct 
research by a “desire to advance understanding, the hope of improving 
patient care through new discoveries, and concerns for their own career 
advancement,” rather than by the promise of patent protection.156  
Furthermore, SACGHS stated that much of the funding for basic genetic 
research likely comes from the federal government,157 so using patents to 
stimulate private investment is not essential to promoting basic genetic 
research.158  Academia already encourages sharing research and 
publishing discoveries,159 and in industry, the clinical community 
requires disclosure before accepting new healthcare products or services, 
so the report concluded that patents are not needed to stimulate 
disclosure.160 
SACGHS also concluded that exclusive rights conferred by a patent 
do not necessarily spur faster test development.161  SACGHS studied a 
number of tests and did not find that patent protection corresponded to 
                                                 
 155.  Steven Teutsch, Introductory Letter to SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, 
& SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND 
THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS (2010), http://oba.od.nih.gov/ 
oba/sacghs/reports/sacghs_patents_report_2010.pdf.  But see the Statement of Dissent to the 
SACGHS report, which recognizes the importance of supporting innovation and converting genetic 
discoveries into accessible diagnostic and treatment tools, and also notes that the cost of developing 
these tools has dramatically increased.  Mara Aspinall et al., Statement of Dissent to SEC’Y’S 
ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE 
PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 
(2010), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/sacghs_patents_report_2010.pdf.  The Statement of 
Dissent concludes that while the patent system might not be perfect, it gives researchers and 
investors some value in return for their time and money.  Id. 
 156.  SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO 
GENETIC TESTS (2010), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/sacghs_Patents_report_2010.pdf 
[hereinafter SACGHS GENE PATENTS REPORT] (citing John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology 
Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 
101 (2001)). 
 157.  Id. at 2 (citing NAT’L SCI. BD., NAT’L. SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 
INDICATORS 2008 (2008)). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. (citing ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1973); Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: 
Putting Patents in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 217 (2006); Kira R. Fabrizio & Alberto Di 
Minin, Commercializing the Laboratory: Faculty Patenting and the Open Science Environment, 37 
RESEARCH POL’Y 914 (2008)). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
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the speed with which a test reaches the market.162  The SACGHS report 
determined that not only are patents unneeded to motivate genetic 
research and investment in genetic research, but also that patents can 
actually harm these goals by discouraging follow-on research.163  In 
some cases, SACGHS found, patents are used to gain a market advantage 
over existing competition, which limits access and does not provide the 
benefit of stimulating innovation.164 
2. Availability and Affordability of Medical Testing 
Patient access to genetic testing depends on “first, basic genetic 
research that generates insights into the genetic basis of particular 
diseases and, second, efforts to translate those discoveries into clinically 
useful, widely available tests.”165  The SACGHS report theorized that 
when a single entity holds a patent to a genetic test, patients have limited 
access to high-quality testing for a number of reasons.166  If the sole 
provider of the test does not accept the patient’s insurance, the patient 
might be unable to afford the test.167  Additionally, second-opinion 
testing is unavailable.168  Finally, the SACGHS report expresses concerns 
about patents eliminating competition that would otherwise lead to 
improved quality of testing techniques, and thus limiting patient access 
to high-quality testing.169 
However, three of the eighteen voting members of SACGHS issued a 
dissenting statement to the SACGHS report.170  The dissent challenged 
the conclusions of the SACGHS report, noting that in general, the current 
U.S. healthcare system does not provide equal, unlimited access to 
medical care and diagnostic tests.171  Patient access to healthcare is not a 
problem unique to genetic testing and therefore will not be solved by 
                                                 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. (citing Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E. Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-
Run Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1193 
(2008)). 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. at 1. 
 166.  Id. at 3. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 4. 
 170.  Aspinall et al., supra note 155. 
 171.  Id. 
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patent law reform.172  Insurance companies are free to refuse to cover 
genetic testing, regardless of related patents or the number of providers 
offering the tests.173  The dissent stated that implementing the SACGHS 
report recommendations would do more harm than good in terms of 
patient access to high-quality genetic testing.174 
Additionally, when SACGHS commissioned case studies to 
determine the effect of patents and exclusive licenses on the price of 
genetic tests, the case studies did not produce evidence that patents and 
exclusive licenses consistently lead to higher costs to patients.175  While 
SACGHS investigated claims that patents lead to inflated prices for 
genetic tests, it found no concrete evidence to this effect.176  In fact, one 
case study found that the unit price of the full-sequence BRCA test was 
comparable to other full-sequence tests performed at both commercial 
and nonprofit laboratories.177 
3. The Patent Thicket and Its Implications for Whole Genome 
Sequencing and Personalized Medicine 
In addition to general availability and affordability concerns, gene 
patent opponents specifically voice a major concern about the effect gene 
patents will have on whole-genome sequencing and personalized 
medicine.178  Opponents fear that as an increasing number of gene 
patents are issued to many different inventors, these intellectual property 
rights will create a “patent thicket,” forcing a whole-genome sequencing 
firm to negotiate licenses with each holder of a gene patent, potentially 
requiring thousands of licenses from many licensors.179  The cost of 
determining the scope and validity of each patent and negotiating 
                                                 
 172.  See id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  SACGHS GENE PATENTS REPORT, supra note 156, at 38–39. 
 176.  Id. at 39. 
 177.  Id. at 38; Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on 
Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian 
Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS MED. S15, S20–24 (2010), reprinted in SACGHS GENE 
PATENTS REPORT, supra note 156,  A-11 to -18 app.A. 
 178.  See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 
1329, 1373, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (fearing 
that the majority’s decision to hold that claims to genes and gene fragments are patent eligible “will 
likely have broad consequences, such as preempting methods for whole-genome sequencing”), 
vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 179.  See, e.g., id. at 1380 (citing SACGHS GENE PATENTS REPORT, supra note 156, at 50–51). 
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licenses as necessary might prove to be prohibitively expensive and 
therefore might impede scientific progress in the fields of whole-genome 
sequencing and personalized medicine.180  The dissent in Association for 
Molecular Pathology worried that “this may well be [an area] in which 
‘too much patent protection can impede rather than promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.’”181 
However, whether this is a serious concern has yet to be 
determined;182 in fact, recent research reveals that current gene patents 
are unlikely to impede whole genome sequencing efforts in this way.  
First, there is a common misconception about the number of human 
genes that have actually been patented.183  There is a widely cited 
statistic that 20% of human genes are patented.184  But in fact, the study 
that led to this statistic actually demonstrated that “with respect to 20% 
of human genes known at the time they conducted their study, either (1) 
the DNA sequence of the gene, or (2) the amino acid sequence encoded 
by the gene, was mentioned in a US patent claim.”185  Contrary to the 
interpretation many have given to the article describing the study’s 
findings, the mere fact that a patent claim mentions a human gene does 
not altogether exclude others from using the gene.186  Thus, the quantity 
of existing gene patents does not necessarily create the feared patent 
thicket. 
Furthermore, neither composition-of-matter claims to isolated genes 
nor diagnostic method claims involving genes are likely to impede 
progress in whole genome sequencing technology.  Composition-of-
                                                 
 180.  Id. (citing SACGHS GENE PATENTS REPORT, supra note 156, at 50–51; Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1076–80 (2008)). 
 181.  Id. (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 182.  See W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t Hinder Whole 
Genome Sequencing and Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1601, 1605 & n.18 (2012) 
(explaining that Myriad’s attorney in Association for Molecular Pathology stated in oral arguments 
that whole genome sequencing was unlikely to violate Myriad’s patents). 
 183.  Chris Holman, Will Gene Patents Impede Whole Genome Sequencing?: Deconstructing the 
Myth that 20% of the Human Genome is Patented, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Aug. 8, 2011, 6:12 
PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/will-gene-patents-impede-whole-genome. 
html. 
 184.  Id. (explaining that while many sources cite this statistic, the idea is ultimately traceable 
back to a single article: Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human 
Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239 (2005)). 
 185.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 186.  See id. (“The implicit assumption that the ‘gene patents’ identified . . . cover all uses of the 
gene . . . mentioned in patent claims is clearly false.”). 
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matter claims are unlikely to impede progress because current 
sequencing technology is unlikely to infringe a claim to an isolated DNA 
molecule.187 
Infringement of a claim to the isolated gene itself occurs only if the 
specific DNA sequence claimed is created or used during whole genome 
sequencing.188  But current whole genome sequencing techniques are 
unlikely to do this;189 instead, current sequencing techniques break DNA 
into small fragments, typically ranging from twenty-five to 1,000 
nucleotides in length, and then sequence those fragments one base at a 
time.190  Finally, the sequences for all fragments are assembled.191  Thus, 
the likelihood of whole genome sequencing infringing a patent claim to a 
specific gene depends on the size of fragments generated.192  A patent for 
a gene that is smaller than the fragments generated might be infringed by 
whole genome sequencing techniques.193  While there are genes with 
sequences less than 1,000 nucleotides long, they are few, so current 
whole genome sequencing methods are unlikely to infringe claims to 
isolated genes.194 
Method claims for comparing and analyzing sequences for 
diagnostic purposes are more likely to be infringed by whole genome 
sequencing, but are also unlikely to impede whole genome sequencing 
efforts for primarily two reasons.  First, claims directed only to 
comparison methods are probably invalid as directed to patent-ineligible 
subject matter.195  Like the comparing and analyzing steps at issue in 
Association for Molecular Pathology, these claims to comparison 
methods attempt to patent abstract ideas or mental processes and are 
therefore not the type of discovery the patent laws are intended to 
protect.196  Second, claims directed to patent-eligible processes involving 
genes are more likely to be valid, but infringement might be avoided by 
                                                 
 187.  Price, supra note 182, at 1622. 
 188.  See id. at 1621. 
 189.  Id. at 1622. 
 190.  Id. at 1619–20 (citing Pauline C. Ng & Ewen F. Kirkness, Whole Genome Sequencing, 628 
METHODS MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 215, 216–17 (2010)). 
 191.  Id. at 1620 (citing Ng & Kirkness, supra note 190, at 216). 
 192.  Id. at 1622. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  See, e.g., id. at 1627 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision in Association for 
Molecular Pathology). 
 196.  See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. 
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utilizing multiple actors to perform the steps in the method claim.197  A 
method claim is infringed only if a single actor performs all steps, or 
controls the performance of all steps, in the claim.198  If a genome 
sequencing company provides a patient with the results of his genetic 
sequencing, the company has performed only the initial step of the 
method claim.199  If the patient then takes his sequence to a physician 
who compares the patient’s sequence to a database containing sequences 
for genetic mutations, the physician has performed only the comparing 
and analyzing step.200  While this is a somewhat simplified explanation 
of joint infringement, parties might avoid liability by having different 
actors perform these various steps.201 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Genes and Genetic Diagnostic Methods Should Not Be Categorically 
Excluded From Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
Based on the current standards for patentability, isolated genes are 
eligible subject matter for patents.  “[A]nything under the sun that is 
made by man”202 is an appropriate subject for a patent, and isolated DNA 
does not fit within one of the well-established exceptions to this general 
rule.203  The Supreme Court has declined to carve out additional 
exceptions and has cautioned lower courts against doing so, suggesting 
that additional policy-based exceptions should come from Congress.204  
But both the Court and Congress should be wary of “adopting categorical 
rules that might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts.”205  The 
broad construction of the patent laws and the Court’s hesitancy to 
recognize additional categorical exceptions to patent-eligible subject 
matter have been vital to affording patent protection to technological 
                                                 
 197.  Price, supra note 182, at 1628–29. 
 198.  Id. at 1628 & n.129 (citing Muniauction, Inc. v. Thompson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328–30 
(Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 199.  Id. at 1629. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 
(1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 203.  See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 204.  See supra text accompanying notes 43–48. 
 205.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010). 
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advances unimaginable at the time § 101 was enacted.206  Thus, neither 
Congress nor the Court, if it again grants certiorari in Association for 
Molecular Pathology, should categorically exclude genes from patent-
eligible subject matter. 
1. Utility, Novelty, Nonobviousness, and Disclosure Requirements 
Should Be Used to Invalidate Questionable Patent Claims 
A party may challenge the validity of a particular patent claim by 
showing that the claim fails to meet the requirements of patentability.207  
First, a party may argue that the claim is directed to patent-ineligible 
subject matter, i.e., the subject of the claim is not the type of discovery 
that should receive patent protection.208  As discussed above, the subject 
of a claim is patent ineligible if it is properly characterized as a law of 
nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea.209  Alternatively or 
additionally, a party can challenge the validity of a patent claim by 
showing that the discovery is not useful, new, or nonobvious, or that the 
claim does not satisfy statutory disclosure requirements.210  Even if the 
subject of a claim is patent eligible, failure to comply with any of the 
other statutory requirements for patentability will render the claim 
invalid.  It is necessary to distinguish patent eligibility from the other 
requirements of patentability.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit in Association 
for Molecular Pathology repeatedly distinguished the concept of patent 
eligibility from patentability, emphasizing that the case addressed only 
the former issue.211  A valid patent claim must be directed to patent-
eligible subject matter and satisfy the other criteria for patentability.  A 
party can successfully challenge the validity of a patent claim without 
ever mentioning the patent eligibility of the subject matter.212 
The requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness should be 
used to invalidate questionable patent claims; a new categorical 
                                                 
 206.  J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001). 
 207.  See 6 CHISUM, supra note 5, § 19.01, at 19-6 (2007) (describing the patent invalidity 
defense to a claim of infringement). 
 208.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 209.  See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
 210.  35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103, 112. 
 211.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1324, 
1332, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, Sept. 25, 2012. 
 212.  See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 37 (1966) (finding a patent claim invalid 
due to failure to meet the requirements of § 103). 
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exception to patent-eligible subject matter should not be used to achieve 
this purpose.  By maintaining a broad interpretation of the statutory 
subject matter encompassed by § 101 and relying on the other 
requirements of patentability to invalidate claims, courts can apply a fine 
filter to all claims and determine which warrant patent protection under 
the current laws. 
The creation of a new categorical exception to patent-eligible subject 
matter, on the other hand, would not allow courts to finely filter patent 
claims relating to isolated DNA, but would instead simply toss out any 
patents relating to genes.  To fully understand the undesirable 
consequences of this approach, it is necessary to consider the big picture 
as it pertains to gene patents.  Much of the debate concerning gene 
patents focuses on the BRCA genes, Myriad’s patents on those genes, and 
the consequences these patents have for breast cancer patients.  This is 
only one aspect, though an important one, of the gene patent debate. 
2. Categorical Exclusion of Gene Patents Will Have Wide-Ranging and 
Unforeseen Impacts 
Because the USPTO has issued gene patents for decades, a 
categorical exclusion of gene patents threatens the settled property rights 
and expectations of the biotechnology industry.213  Furthermore, from a 
big-picture perspective, many biotechnology companies that have no 
interest in breast cancer research would suffer tremendously if genes 
were excluded from patent-eligible subject matter.  All gene patent 
holders should not suffer from a challenge to merely fifteen patent claims 
within seven patents held by a single company.214  Hans Sauer, the 
Deputy General Counsel for Intellectual Property for the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization (BIO),215 posed an illustrative hypothetical.216  
Suppose a small biotechnology firm after spending significant time and 
                                                 
 213.  Oral Argument at 33:57, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d 1303 (No. 2010-1406), 
available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/2010-1406/2012-07-20/all. 
 214.  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1309–10 (discussing the claims at issue). 
 215.  BIO “provide[s] advocacy, business development, and communication services for over 
1,100 [biotechnology companies] worldwide.”  About BIO, BIO, http://www.bio.org/articles/about-
bio (last visited Aug. 24, 2012).  BIO represents firms of all sizes involved in the research and 
development of “healthcare, agricultural, industrial, and environmental biotechnology products.”  Id. 
 216.  Hans Sauer, Deputy Gen. Counsel for Intellectual Prop., Biotechnology Indus. Org., 
Remarks at Gene Patent Debate hosted by University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and 
The Joseph Cohen Lecture Fund: Do Gene Patents Kill? (Oct. 13, 2011). 
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money on research and development217 obtains a patent on a cucumber 
gene.  The company relies on this patent to recoup on its research 
investment.218  A patent on a cucumber gene does not elicit the same 
emotional response that the BRCA genes do, but the cucumber gene 
patent holder’s interests depend on the ultimate resolution of Association 
for Molecular Pathology.  If genes are excluded from patent-eligible 
subject matter, the cucumber gene patent holder, along with all the other 
small biotechnology companies holding such patents, loses its 
intellectual property rights, its opportunity to profit from its research and 
development investments, and, ultimately, its ability to stay in 
business.219  While it is easy to lose sight of the cucumber patent holder 
among discussions about BRCA genes and Myriad, it is important to 
remember that the cucumber patent holder will fall as collateral damage 
to any action that narrows the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.  
Furthermore, as Part II.C.1 explains, most biotechnology firms are small 
businesses.  The cucumber patent holder is actually the industry norm.  
These small businesses should not suffer from a categorical exclusion 
driven largely by a single, highly emotional case.  Sauer’s hypothetical 
illustrates the “wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts” that the Court in 
Bilski cautioned would follow from the adoption of a new categorical 
exclusion to patent-eligible subject matter.220 
B. Balancing the Competing Interests Surrounding Gene Patents 
While isolated genes are appropriate subject matter for patents,221 
gene patents raise valid concerns about patient access to high-quality 
genetic tests.222  Congress should balance the interest of incentivizing 
scientific innovation with the availability of certain medical tests and 
treatments.  In discussing potential methods for balancing these interests, 
two preliminary points are noteworthy.  First, these competing interests 
are not unique to gene patents.  As noted by the Federal Circuit, 
“Inherent in our patent system is a ‘tension between the desire to freely 
                                                 
 217.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 218.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 219.  See supra Part II.C.1 (describing patents as typically the only assets sufficiently stable and 
valuable to secure the capital required for small biotechnology companies to develop and 
commercialize their inventions). 
 220.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010). 
 221.  See supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 222.  See supra Part II.C.2. 
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exploit the full potential of our inventive resources and the need to create 
an incentive to deploy those resources’ by granting the right to exclude to 
those who promote the progress of the useful arts.”223  The current 
system recognizes these competing interests, and the patentability 
requirements discussed above are the means chosen to balance them.  
Second, it is necessary to define the proper role of patent law in this 
debate.  For example, some critics of gene patents complain that not all 
insurance companies cover genetic testing.224  Health insurance is 
undoubtedly an issue of great importance.  But it is not a concern unique 
to genetic testing, nor is it the job of the USPTO to address such 
concerns.  Neither the country’s health insurance industry, nor a 
particular company’s business practice is an issue properly addressed by 
the patent laws.  Similarly, some critics of gene patents oppose the fees 
associated with genetic testing.225  Such criticism fails to account for the 
tremendous amount of time and money a company invests in developing 
such tests.  While performing the actual test might be relatively 
inexpensive, the company likely spent hundreds of millions of dollars on 
researching and developing the test, which it must recoup.226  Again, 
these concerns fall outside the scope of issues properly addressed by 
patent law.  Thus, the potential balancing solutions suggested below will 
not address such issues. 
                                                 
 223.  Cover v. Hydramatic Packing Co., 83 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989)). 
 224.  See, e.g., Karen P. Mann, Gene Patents: Perspectives from the Clinical Laboratory, 14 
MOLECULAR DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 137, 139 (2010) (describing a situation where a patient was 
forced to pay $10,000 for a genetic test not covered by insurance).  Myriad, however, has invested in 
educating the medical community and insurance industry, and provides free testing to individuals 
who exhibit a specified level of economic need.  The Defendants, supra note 147, at 13–14. 
 225.  See Andrew S. Robertson, The Role of DNA Patents in Genetic Test Innovation and Access, 
9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 377, 387 (2011) (noting that BRCA testing in the U.S. is five times 
as expensive as similar testing in areas where BRCA gene patents have been found invalid (citing 
Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 177, at 528)). 
 226.  
[T]he Patent Act creates an incentive for innovation.  The economic rewards during the 
period of exclusivity are the carrot.  The patent owner expends resources in expectation 
of receiving this reward.  Upon grant of the patent, the only limitation on the size of the 
carrot should be the dictates of the marketplace. 
Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(alteration in original) (quoting King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)). 
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1. Suggestions from Previous Policy Reports 
Previous policy reports from around the world have suggested means 
for balancing these competing interests.227  The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics suggested that the scope of protection for patents claiming 
isolated sequences of DNA be limited to the specific uses the inventor 
has demonstrated that the sequences may be put to, rendering the “scope 
of the monopoly awarded . . . commensurate with the actual contribution 
by the inventor.”228  The Australian Law Reform Commission outlined 
an “experimental use exemption that would not be precluded by a 
commercial objective in undertaking the research.”229  The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development230 encouraged patent 
holders to license genetic inventions “on terms and conditions that seek 
to ensure the widest public access to, and variety of, products and 
services based on the inventions.”231  Finally, the Federal Trade 
Commission suggested that patents with an extremely broad scope 
should be limited, and that challenging invalid patents should be made 
easier.232 
The following discussion expands on some of these suggestions and 
examines their merits.  Congress should enact a statutory research 
exemption for research activities involving patented genes and consider 
solutions like compulsory licensing or exercising march-in rights under 
the Bayh-Dole Act233 with caution, because such action seriously 
interferes with patentees’ freedom to negotiate and enter into contracts.  
Most importantly, courts should interpret current patent law to properly 
construe the scope of claims to genes and genetic diagnostic methods and 
use the requirements for patentability to ensure that only deserving 
claims receive patent protection. 
                                                 
 227.  See SACGHS GENE PATENTS REPORT, supra note 155, at 81–83. 
 228.  Id. at 81 (quoting NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA 65–
66 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229.  Id. at 82 (citing AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, GENES AND INGENUITY: GENE PATENTING 
AND HUMAN HEALTH 24 (2004)). 
 230.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is a collaborative effort 
among 30 countries to address various challenges of globalization.  Id. 
 231.  Id. (quoting ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING 
OF GENETIC INVENTIONS 9 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 232.  Id. (citing FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND 
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 7–12 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf). 
 233.  35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006). 
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2. Congress Should Enact a Statutory Research Exemption 
Congress should expand the current experimental use exemption to 
immunize researchers from infringement liability for their research 
efforts involving patented genes.  The experimental use exemption is a 
product of common law that provides a defense to patent infringement 
for “experimental use.”234  Many academic researchers assume their 
research activities are covered by the experimental use exemption,235 but 
the current exemption is actually quite narrow and covers a very limited 
class of research. 
In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit established the 
narrow limits of the current doctrine.236  Prior to this case, there was little 
precedent to guide the application of the experimental use defense.237  In 
particular, there had been almost no cases in which a nonprofit, 
educational institution was alleged as the infringer.238  But this scenario 
arose in Madey, and the Federal Circuit rejected the fairly broad 
construction given to the experimental use exemption by the district 
court.239  The district court classified experimental uses as those that are 
“solely for research, academic, or experimental purposes.”240  The district 
court, relying on a previous opinion from the Federal Circuit, further 
held that the exemption applied to experimental, nonprofit purposes.241  
But, the Federal Circuit rejected this interpretation of the experimental 
use exemption and instead provided a much stricter construction.242  The 
court held that the exemption does not cover activities that are “in any 
way commercial in nature” or “conduct that . . . keep[s] with the alleged 
infringer’s legitimate business, regardless of commercial 
                                                 
 234.  Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 235.  See Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and 
Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 305 (2007) (stating that 
many researchers “do not let the existence of patents dictate research agendas”). 
 236.  Madey, 307 F.3d 1351. 
 237.  Id. at 1362. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. at 1361–62. 
 240.  Id. at 1361 (quoting Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425 (M.D.N.C. 2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 241.  Id. (quoting Madey, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 425).  The district court relied on multiple cases, 
including Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in 
reaching this conclusion.  Madey, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 425. 
 242.  Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1349). 
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implications.”243  As applied to major research universities, school 
funded research projects further the university’s “business objectives” by 
educating students and faculty, strengthening the school’s reputation as a 
research institution, and attracting desirable students and faculty.244  
Thus, the experimental use exemption does not afford immunity from 
infringement liability to such research.245  The Federal Circuit has made 
clear that the exemption applies only to activities undertaken for 
“amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry.”246 
In reality, lawsuits against researchers are rare.247  A patent holder 
stands to gain little in either money or reputation by suing a research 
institution.248  Rather, lawsuits are more likely to arise when the alleged 
infringer is engaging in commercial activity.249  For example, Myriad 
only actively enforced its patents against researchers when they began 
performing commercial-level testing.250  Despite this reality, the mere 
possibility of being sued is likely enough to prevent some researchers 
from engaging in even noncommercial research activities.  For this 
reason, a statutory research exemption would prove valuable. 
Because the current experimental use exemption is so narrow, the 
Court must either broaden the construction of the current doctrine, or 
Congress must provide some type of statutory protection for research 
involving patented genes.  Such congressional action would both 
encourage research and alleviate fear of lawsuits for patent infringement, 
thereby addressing several of the concerns of gene patent opponents.  
Enabling research on patented genes would allow nonholders of patents 
to confirm experimental results, enhance the quality of existing genetic 
tests, and promote further innovation involving the patented genes. 
                                                 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  See Christopher M. Holman, Learning From Litigation: What Can Lawsuits Teach Us 
About the Role of Human Gene Patents in Research and Innovation?, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
215, 260–63 (2009). 
 248.  See id. at 259 (distinguishing public, noncommercial research from private research, and 
noting that university research especially is perceived as being “more noble and in need of 
protection” than research by biotechnology companies, which are “portrayed as villains, using 
patents to block university research”). 
 249.  Id. at 260. 
 250.  The Defendants, supra note 148, at 12–13. 
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3. Compulsory License Schemes Would Interfere with Patent Holders’ 
Freedom to Contract and Are Not Desirable 
A compulsory licensing scheme should not be implemented, because 
compulsory licenses will interfere with a patent holder’s freedom to 
contract.  Under a compulsory licensing scheme, the holder of a gene 
patent would be required to license certain patent rights to licensees.251  
Some commentators have suggested that gene patent holders should be 
forced to license their rights to isolated sequences of DNA to any 
scientist conducting commercial research pertaining to the gene.252  In 
return, the licensee would pay a reasonable licensing fee to the licensor, 
with the fee based on the value of the product resulting from the 
licensee’s research.253  In theory, this scheme encourages licensees to 
invest in research because the royalty they pay would be proportional to 
the success they achieve in their research.254  It also motivates patent 
holders to license their inventions because they would be compensated 
by successful licensees.255 
Congress should not yet take such extreme action for multiple 
reasons.  First, biotechnology companies already have natural incentives 
to engage in voluntary license agreements because each additional 
application involving the claimed gene increases the value of the 
patent.256  Second, the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling a patented invention lies at the heart of patent rights, and a 
patentee has the right to refuse to license his patented product.257  The 
government should not interfere with a company’s ability to freely enter 
into contractual license agreements with whomever the company 
chooses.  And finally, there already exist some limits on a patentee’s 
                                                 
 251.  See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the 
United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use 
Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1679 (2001) (describing a proposed compulsory licensing 
system). 
 252.  See, e.g., id. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. at 1680 (citing Andrew Pollack, Is Everything for Sale?, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at 
C1). 
 257.  Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908) (“[E]xclusion may be 
said to [be] the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of 
property to use or not use it, without question of motive.” (citing Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 
184 U.S. 540, 546 (1901))). 
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right to exclude.  One such limitation, an antitrust violation, arises if a 
patent holder: (1) sues to enforce a patent that “was obtained through 
knowing and willful fraud;”258 (2) brings a baseless infringement suit 
with the intent to inflict collateral, anticompetitive injury;259 or (3) 
illegally ties the sale of patented inventions to unpatented inventions, 
thereby gaining a monopoly beyond the scope of the patent.260  Thus, if a 
company exhibits particularly egregious behavior in regard to one of its 
patents, antitrust law might provide an appropriate remedy.  Because 
there already exist remedies for extreme instances of a company refusing 
to deal with potential licensees, a compulsory license scheme is 
inappropriate until it is clear that anticompetitive licensing practices are a 
real problem with respect to gene patents. 
4. The Bayh-Dole Act Provides March-in Rights on Federally Funded 
Research, Which Should Be Exercised with Care 
The Bayh-Dole Act places some limitations on patent rights to 
federally funded inventions.261  The Act enables recipients of federal 
funds to retain title to inventions developed with those funds.262  The 
purpose of the Act is to incentivize commercialization of federally 
funded inventions, because prior to the Act, when the government 
retained title to all federally funded inventions, the technology was rarely 
commercialized.263  If the recipient of federal funding does choose to 
retain title, the funding agency has “march-in rights” on the patent.264  
March-in rights enable the agency, under certain circumstances, to 
mandate that the recipient of federal funds grant a license for the 
patented invention to a third party.265  If the recipient fails to achieve a 
practical application for the patented invention, the agency has authority 
                                                 
 258.  In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Glass 
Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 259.  See id. (citing Glass Equip., 174 F.3d at 1343). 
 260.  Id. at 1327 (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990)). 
 261.  See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006). 
 262.  Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products, and Public Health: An 
Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1098 (1999). 
 263.  Id. at 1097–98. 
 264.  Id. at 1099. 
 265.  35 U.S.C. § 203(a). 
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to exercise its march-in rights.266  March-in rights are also available if 
action is necessary to address health or safety needs.267 
While no federal agency has actually exercised march-in rights yet, 
march-in petitions have requested that federal agencies march in and 
mandate licensing.  For example, in 1997, CellPro sought a license for 
stem-cell separation technology that was developed at The Johns 
Hopkins University under a grant from the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH).268  When CellPro failed to obtain a license and was found liable 
for patent infringement, it petitioned for government march in.269  
CellPro claimed both that the University and Baxter Healthcare 
Corporation, the ultimate sublicensee, had failed to take reasonable steps 
to achieve a practical application for the patented invention and that 
government action was needed to address health and safety needs not 
met by Baxter.270  The NIH, however, found that Baxter was taking 
reasonable steps to achieve practical application.271  The NIH also found 
that a health need existed, but that Baxter was reasonably addressing that 
need.272  Various parties expressed concern that exercising march-in 
rights in this situation would undermine existing licensing rights.273  
Ultimately, the NIH declined to march in, due, at least in part, to 
overwhelming public opposition.274 
The public opposition to the CellPro petition suggests that march-in 
rights are not an ideal solution to balancing interests in the gene patent 
debate.  March-in rights raise concerns similar to those raised by 
compulsory licenses, namely that threatening or exercising march-in 
rights interferes with contractual freedom in the marketplace.275  Parties 
should be free to negotiate the terms of their license agreements, 
including the terms for terminating rights under the license.  March-in 
rights eliminate this freedom.  Furthermore, there are already natural 
                                                 
 266.  Id. § 203(a)(1). 
 267.  Id. § 203(a)(2). 
 268.  McGarey & Levey, supra note 262, at 1100. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. at 1101. 
 272.  Id. at 1102. 
 273.  Id. at 1101. 
 274.  See id. (“The NIH based its determination on a voluminous public administrative record, 
consisting of the filings and responses of the parties, letters from Members of Congress, letters from 
biotechnology companies and funding recipient universities and other members of the public . . . .”). 
 275.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
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incentives for companies to voluntarily enter into license agreements.276  
Indeed, a patent holder profits each time he licenses his invention.277  
Threatening or invoking march-in rights against holders of gene patents, 
thereby interfering with the public’s freedom to contract, is not a 
preferred solution to the gene patent debate. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Genes and diagnostic methods are patent-eligible subject matter 
under current patent law, and if the Supreme Court grants certiorari in 
Association for Molecular Pathology for a second time, it should 
continue to hold them as such.  Courts can properly exclude claims 
undeserving of patent protection by ensuring the requirements of utility, 
novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate disclosure are met.  Carving out 
genes as an additional exception to patent-eligible subject matter 
threatens far-reaching and unforeseen consequences.  To balance the 
competing interests of incentivizing research and making genetic testing 
and treatment available and affordable to patients, Congress should enact 
a statutory research exemption that immunizes researchers from 
infringement liability for performing noncommercial activities involving 
the patented gene.  Such congressional action would both encourage 
research and alleviate fear of lawsuits for patent infringement, thereby 
addressing several concerns of gene patent opponents.  Enabling research 
on patented genes would allow nonholders of patents to confirm 
experimental results, enhance the quality of existing genetic tests, and 
promote further innovation involving the patented genes. 
In contrast, Congress should view with caution suggested solutions 
like compulsory licensing or exercising march-in rights under the Bayh-
Dole Act.  Such action seriously interferes with patent holders’ freedom 
to negotiate and enter into contracts and will likely meet serious public 
opposition.  These proposals overemphasize the desire to make genetic 
testing and treatment readily available, while ignoring the need to 
incentivize innovation and commercialization. 
Ideal balancing solutions give appropriate weight to the need to 
incentivize biotechnology research.  In discussing the importance of 
accessible and affordable genetic testing, it is important to remember that 
without patent protection the biotechnology research that lies at the heart 
                                                 
 276.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
 277.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
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of these discoveries might never have occurred.  The genetic tests to 
which patients demand access would never have been developed.  For 
this reason, any solution ultimately implemented must give fair 
consideration to the need to incentivize innovation within the 
biotechnology industry so that the public may continue to benefit from 
its efforts. 
 
